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SECTION 15(1) AT THE 
SUPREME COURT 2001-2002: 
CAUTION AND CONFLICT IN 
DEFINING “THE MOST 
DIFFICULT RIGHT” 
Sonia Lawrence* 
Since early 2001, the Supreme Court of Canada has considered section 15(1) 
in three important rulings: Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), Trinity 
Western University v. College of Teachers (British Columbia) and Lavoie v. 
Canada (Public Service Commission).1 Both Dunmore and Trinity Western 
raise but do not satisfactorily address issues involving the interaction of equal-
ity and other rights or freedoms, and section 15 failed to figure prominently in 
either ruling. In Lavoie, on the other hand, the Court agreed that a section 15(1) 
analysis was required. However, its fractured approach revealed that the search 
for common ground on the understanding of equality rights remains elusive. 
The cases do not display a unifying theme. The concurring reasons in Dun-
more suggest that future claims of discrimination based on the characteristics of 
a group of workers may get at least a lukewarm reception at the Court.2 The 
majority’s decision to avoid  
section 15(1) in favour of section 2(d) leaves us without much guidance in that 
regard. The facts of Trinity Western bring to the fore the potential clash of 
religious freedom and equality rights, a clash that will continue to trouble Char-
                                                                                                                                                              
* Assistant Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School. In 1999-2000, she served as Law Clerk 
to Chief Justice McLachlin at the Supreme Court of Canada. The author would like to thank Lauren 
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1
  Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General) (2001), 207 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [hereinafter Dun-
more]; Trinity Western University v. College of Teachers (British Columbia), [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 
[hereinafter TWU]; Lavoie v. Canada (Public Service Commission), 2002 SCC 23 [hereinafter 
Lavoie]. 
2
  As they have in the past: see Reference re Workers’ Compensation Act, 1983 (Newfound-
land), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 922; Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989. 
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ter3 jurisprudence in the years ahead. With the exception of L’Heureux-Dubé J., 
the Court chose not to undertake a Charter analysis in Trinity Western. The 
majority resolved the case on administrative law grounds. Nevertheless, all of 
the reasons referred to section 15 values and their importance in determining 
the limit of section 2(a) rights.  
Lavoie v. Canada is the only case that directly applied the section 15(1) 
analysis set out in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) 
in the past year.4 The Court split badly, with the plurality dismissing the appel-
lant’s claim that the Public Service Commission’s hiring preference for citizens 
was unconstitutional. The majority found that the preference violated section 
15(1), but could be saved at the section 1 stage of analysis. Justice Arbour and 
LeBel J., each writing their own reasons, found that section 15 was not vio-
lated, while the Chief Justice and L’Heureux-Dubé J. found that there was a 
violation that could not be saved under section 1. Lavoie cracks the veneer of 
unanimity which the Court projected in Law, and provides a perhaps unex-
pected and disturbing contrast to the Court’s first section 15(1) decision, An-
drews v. Law Society of British Columbia.5 It reveals significant problems in 
the application of the Law test, and possibly a growing dispute about the proper 
application of section 1 in section 15 cases. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At the 2001 Constitutional Cases Conference, McLachlin C.J. described the 
Charter right to equality as “the most difficult right.”6 The evidence since that 
speech suggests that despite the impressive effort made in Law v. Canada to 
create a test that the whole court could agree with, the Court is far from unani-
mous on how the “human dignity” based test should be applied.7 Similarly, the 
Court managed to skilfully but clearly duck the question of the conflict between 
                                                                                                                                                              
3
  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), c. 11. 
4
 [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 [hereinafter Law]. 
5
 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143. 
6
 McLachlin, “Equality: The most difficult right” (2001) 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 17. 
7
  The Lavoie ruling supports the views of commentators who see the human dignity stand-
ard introduced in Law as vague and malleable, and for shifting to s. 15 a balancing of individual 
rights and legislative objectives that ought to take place at the s. 1 stage of analysis. See Martin, 
“Balancing Individual Rights to Equality and Social Goals” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 299, at 329-
32; Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (2001, Student Edition), s. 52.7(b); Ross, “A Flawed 
Synthesis of the Law” (2000) 11 Constitutional Forum 74. Donna Greschner shares the view that 
the Court achieved consensus at a high level of abstraction in Law. Nevertheless, she defends the 
Law test as more likely to promote substantive equality than any of the alternatives. See Greschner, 
“Does Law Advance the Cause of Equality?” (2001) 27 Queen’s L.J. 299. 
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equality principles and other fundamental freedoms (namely freedom of relig-
ion). Thus 2001-02 has not involved grand announcements of new guiding 
principles in equality jurisprudence. Neither, for the most part, have the deci-
sions over the past year managed to clarify past jurisprudence. We have come 
out of the latest term with an equality jurisprudence as muddy as it ever was, 
with grand principles intact, but practicalities unclear.8  
II. THE CASES 
1. Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General) 
Dunmore involved a challenge to the repeal of the Agricultural Labour Rela-
tions Act, 1999, in 1995.9 Enacted only a few years earlier by the NDP govern-
ment of Ontario, the Act extended collective bargaining rights to agricultural 
workers. The bases of the challenge were section 2(d) and section 15(1). In 
1997, in a ruling later affirmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal, Sharpe J. con-
sidered and rejected the claim that the repeal was discriminatory, on the basis 
that “agricultural workers” did not constitute an analogous ground of discrimi-
nation under section 15(1).10 
At the Supreme Court, only two judges, L’Heureux-Dubé (concurring in the 
result) and Major JJ. (dissenting) considered section 15(1). The majority de-
cided the case on the basis of section 2(d) and deemed it unnecessary to con-
tinue through the section 15(1) analysis. However, the majority did see fit to 
make some comments about the proper application of section 15(1) in connec-
tion with section 2(d). In fact, given the cool reception the Court gave the 
section 15(1) claims in Delisle11 and the Workers’ Compensation Reference,12 
perhaps we ought to be surprised that the majority refrained from making nega-
tive comments about the section 15 claim in Dunmore. 
The dissenters offered opposing views on the section 15(1) claim. Madame 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé concluded that agricultural workers are an analogous 
group, while Major J. adopted the conclusions of Sharpe J. in finding that no 
analogous grounds existed. In effect, we learn little from this case, although we 
could at least conclude that the alliance forged in Law is breaking down. The 
                                                                                                                                                              
8
  Appendix A contains a partial list of Supreme Court s. 15 cases currently on reserve or 
granted leave to appeal. These cases might provide some further elucidation on s. 15(1) before the 
end of 2002. 
9
  S.O. 1994, c. 6 [rep. by Labour Relations and Employment Statute Law Amendment Act, 
1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, s. 80(1), Ontario Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c.1, Sched. A]. 
10
  (1997), 155 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (Ont. Gen. Div.); (1999), 182 D.L.R. (4th) 471 (Ont. C.A.). 
11
  Supra, note 2, at paras. 42-46, per Bastarche J. for the majority. 
12
  Supra, note 2, at 924. 
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two judges that did consider section 15(1) reached opposite conclusions. The 
choice to decide the case on section 2(d) grounds might have been based as 
much on pragmatism as on principle. 
2. Trinity Western University v. College of Teachers (British Columbia) 
Despite the fact that TWU is not really a section 15(1) case, but rather an 
administrative law case in which the University requested an order of manda-
mus, the clash between equality rights and religious freedom that produced the 
litigation is an increasingly important one in Charter jurisprudence. At issue 
was a decision of the British Columbia College of Teachers denying certifica-
tion to Trinity Western University’s teaching program. The only judge applying 
section 15(1) was L’Heureux-Dubé J., in dissent. The majority, while giving 
great play to the principles and values behind section 15(1), did not actually 
engage in a section 15(1) analysis. In fact, the majority decision skilfully ducks 
what promises to be a major area of contention in the future, the interplay or 
conflict of section 15(1) and section 2(a). 
TWU, located in British Columbia, is an educational institution affiliated 
with the Evangelical Free Church of Canada. The University offers a teacher 
training program in which students spend four years at TWU, and a fifth year at 
Simon Fraser University. The British Columbia College of Teachers rejected 
TWU’s application for permission to assume full responsibility for this pro-
gram. TWU wanted to have full responsibility in order to have the program 
better reflect its Christian world view. The BCCT based its refusal on the con-
clusion that it was contrary to the public interest to have a teacher education 
program offered by a private institution which appears to follow discriminatory 
practices. The “discriminatory practices” in question were the TWU Commu-
nity Standards, applicable to all students, faculty and staff. Specifically, TWU 
maintained a list of “PRACTICES THAT ARE BIBLICALLY CONDEMNED”, which 
included “sexual sins including . . . homosexual behaviour.” All members of 
the TWU community were asked to sign a document in which they agreed to 
refrain from such activities.  
This case came to the courts for judicial review of the decision of the BCCT. 
The issue was whether the BCCT had jurisdiction to look at the discriminatory 
nature of a teaching program under the public interest component of the Teach-
ing Profession Act,13 and if so, whether the BCCT’s decision was reasonable. 
Both lower courts found that there was no reasonable basis for the decision, 
although they differed on the question of jurisdiction.  
                                                                                                                                                              
13
  R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 449. 
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Despite its administrative law focus, the case has some importance for those 
interested in Charter equality. The majority characterized this issue dramati-
cally as “how to reconcile the religious freedoms of individuals wishing to 
attend TWU with the equality concerns of students in B.C.’s public school 
system, concerns that may be shared with their parents and society generally.”14 
However, somewhat anticlimactically this clash of rights and values is inter-
preted away by the majority: “the scope of the freedom of religion and equality 
rights that have come into conflict in this appeal can be circumscribed and 
thereby reconciled.”15 The majority decision is based on administrative law 
principles. There was no evidence of discriminatory practices by TWU gradu-
ates, and this left the BCCT without a basis for their decision to deny accredita-
tion. In other words, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the 
majority did not have to address the possibility of the practice of Charter  
protected religious beliefs which are antithetical to the Charter ideal of equal-
ity. The anticlimax is not so much in the legal ruling (which accords with the 
decisions in Ross and Keegstra16 – the issue is what is being taught in the class-
room), as in the very thin facts. There was no evidence suggesting that TWU 
graduates were creating situations akin to either Ross (racist beliefs publicly 
held can poison the learning environment even if they are not discussed in the 
classroom) or Keegstra. Within the next year, however, the Supreme Court will 
hear Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36, which might force the 
Court to more directly address the relative constitutional priority of religious 
beliefs and equality values.17  
                                                                                                                                                              
14
  TWU, supra, note 1, at para. 28. 
15
   Id., at para. 37. See also Buckingham, “Caesar and God: Limits to Religious Freedom in 
Canada and South Africa” (2001) 15 S.C.L.R. (2d) 461 at 477-95, for a more extensive discussion 
of resolving clashes between religious freedoms and other rights. Buckingham’s thorough consider-
ation refers to the decision of the South African Constitutional Court in Christian Education South 
Africa v. Minister of Education (2000), 4 S.A. 757, 2000 (10) B.C.L.R. 1051 (C.C.). 
16
  Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 [hereinafter Ross]; R. 
v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697. 
17
  Chamberlain v. School District No. 36 (Surrey) (2000), 191 D.L.R. (4th) 128 (B.C. C.A.); 
leave to appeal to SCC granted on October 4, 2001, without reasons. In 1996, James Chamberlain, 
a teacher at an elementary school in Surrey, British Columbia, asked for the school board’s approv-
al to use three books, all portraying families with same-sex parents, as educational resource materi-
als in kindergarten and grade one classrooms. The school board passed a resolution prohibiting 
teachers in Surrey from using the books. Chamberlain and four others applied to B.C.’s Supreme 
Court for judicial review, claiming that the resolution banning the books violated the province’s 
School Act ([R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 412] specifically, section 76(1) which requires that schools be 
conducted on “strictly secular” principles) and was unconstitutional because it discriminated 
against gays and lesbians. For its part, the school board contended that its decision was made in the 
best interests of school children, in light of the strong religious and moral views in the community 
against homosexuality. The trial decision went against the school board, but the Court of Appeal 
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Madame Justice L’Heureux-Dubé however, never known to shy away from a 
fight, engaged the issue head on. In her view, the conflict between Charter 
values is properly dealt with at section 1, and she relies on the methodology the 
Court employed in mediating between section 15 values and section 2(b) rights 
in Ross.18 In that case, the conflict was dealt with at section 1.  
The decision in TWU allows three conclusions: 
 
• Section 15 values, as opposed to formal claims that section 15 has been 
violated, are and will continue to be important, indeed deciding, factors 
in a variety of cases, whether strictly in the Charter context or in the 
administrative law context; 
• We have no statement from the majority about whether the Ross ap-
proach would be followed in dealing with a genuine clash between sec-
tion 2(a) and section 15 (although the facts in TWU provide ample 
material for imagining the form such a clash could take); and  
• The court is not unanimous in its thinking on these questions. 
 
Of course, a dissent from L’Heureux-Dubé J. is hardly significant in and of 
itself. In fact, agreement from L’Heureux-Dubé J. is more likely to raise eye-
brows. However, the final case that will be considered here, Lavoie, certainly 
suggests that whatever unanimity the court may have had about section 15 has 
completely broken down.  
                                                                                                                                                              
held that the School Act “cannot make religious unbelief a condition of participation in the setting 
of the moral agenda. [para. 31]” Accordingly, the trial judge’s ruling that the school board’s deci-
sion was ultra vires because it was influenced by religious beliefs could not be sustained. “No 
society can be said to be truly free where only those whose morals are uninfluenced by religion are 
entitled to participate in deliberations related to moral issues of education in public schools,” the 
Court declared. “In [our] respectful view ‘strictly secular’ so interpreted could not survive scrutiny 
in the light of the freedom of conscience and religion guaranteed by s. 2 of the Charter and the 
equality rights guaranteed by s. 15. [para. 34]” The issues on appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Canada include (1) whether the religious views of some trustees and parents regarding homosexual-
ity were a legitimate basis for the school board’s decision, having regard to the requirements of 
B.C.’s School Act; (2) whether the board’s resolution infringes freedom of religion and expression 
and the guarantee of equality under the Charter; and (3) whether the Court of Appeal erred in 
failing to consider the Charter issues.  
 Case description is taken from the Supreme Court of Canada website, accessed 28-May-02, 
<http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/information/hearings/spring/spring_e.html#28654>. 
18
  Supra, note 16. 
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3. Lavoie v. Canada (Public Service Commission)  
Elizabeth Lavoie, Jeanne To-Thanh-Hien and Janine Bailey challenged sec-
tion 16(4)(c) of the Public Service Employment Act.19 The section gives prefer-
ence to Canadian citizens in the appointment decisions of the Public Service 
Commission. Applications made by the three women were accepted, but were 
not referred to the requesting department, as the women were all foreign na-
tionals without Canadian citizenship.  
The Federal Court Trial Division found that section 15(1) had been violated, 
but that the provision was saved at section 1.20 At the Federal Court of Appeal, 
one judge found no violation of section 15(1), two judges found section 15(1) 
violated, but where one found it saved at section 1, the other did not.21 The 
Supreme Court also split badly in the decision, with Gonthier, Iacobucci, Basta-
rache, and Major JJ. finding a violation of section 15(1) saved at section 1, and 
the Chief Justice, L’Heureux-Dubé and Binnie JJ. finding a violation not saved 
by section 1. Justice Arbour, on her own, found no violation of section 15(1), 
and LeBel J. wrote reasons to the same effect.  
Lavoie raises several interesting, if troubling, issues, at the section 15(1) and 
section 1 stages of analysis. All of the reasons purport to apply the Law test, 
which confirms the criticism that the test is too vague and open-ended and 
cannot be the basis for consistent decision-making under section 15(1).22  
The majority of the Court does reject (again) the similarly situated test, this 
time as described in the dissenting judgment of Marceau, J.A. from the Federal 
Court of Appeal. Marceau J.A. had argued:  
(1) that s. 15(1) permits of differential treatment to the extent individuals are “dif-
ferently situated” …; and (2) that section 15(1) permits distinctions that are “rele-
vant” to the underlying legislative objective… 
“In his [Marceau J.A.’s] view,” wrote Bastarache J.,  
either of these principles could provide a basis for guaranteeing equal protection to 
non-citizens in the context of laws having nothing to do with citizenship per se (as 
in Andrews), but not in the context of laws whose very raison d’être is the defini-
tion of citizenship (as in this case). In the latter case, it may be argued, first, that 
citizens and non-citizens are so differently situated that they do not merit equal 
                                                                                                                                                              
19
  R.S.C. 1985, c. P-33. 
20
  [1995] 2 F.C. 623. 
21
  [2000] 1 F.C. 3 (Marceau J.A. wrote the reasons, Desjardins J.A. concurring, Linden J.A. 
dissenting). 
22
  See supra, note 4. 
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treatment and, second, that citizenship is a relevant (and indeed necessary) category 
on which unequal treatment is based.23  
This reasoning is very similar to the “relevancy” approach taken by the ma-
jority in Egan v. Canada24 and apparently discarded in Law, and Bastarache J. 
rightly rejects the respondents’ suggestion that this approach be taken: 
The respondents imply that [“relationship between the ground upon which the 
claim is based and the nature of the differential treatment” (Law, at para. 69)] 
should also function to permit differential treatment on the basis of citizenship. In 
their words: 
  . . . it is the essence of the concept of citizenship that it confers certain 
rights and entitlements on citizens that are necessarily denied to non-
citizens. …. What [Ms. Lavoie and Ms. Bailey] inveigh as simply another 
entitlement-denying law operating against non-citizens is, in reality, an 
original and fundamental citizenship-defining provision that establishes a 
basic and universal attribute of the status of citizen.25 
The response of the majority perhaps reflects not the outright rejection of the 
similarly situated test, but rather the realization that the test itself leaves open 
the question of what is similar and what is not.26 In this case, the Court decides 
that what is similar about citizens and non-citizens is more relevant than what is 
not similar: 
“…. to the extent non-citizens are “differently situated” than citizens, it is only be-
cause the legislature has accorded them a unique legal status. In all relevant re-
spects — sociological, economic, moral, intellectual — non-citizens are equally 
vital members of Canadian society and deserve tantamount concern and respect. 
The only recognized exception to this rule is where the Constitution itself with-
holds a benefit from non-citizens, as was the case in Chiarelli, supra. . . . [T]he dis-
tinction in this case finds no authorization in the Charter and, more broadly, is not 
made on the basis of any “actual personal differences between individuals”; see 
Law, supra, at para. 71. If anything, the distinction places an additional burden on 
an already disadvantaged group. Such a distinction is impossible to square with this 
Court’s finding in Andrews, supra, at p.183, which held that “[a] rule which bars an 
entire class of persons from certain forms of employment, solely on the grounds of 
a lack of citizenship status and without consideration of educational and profes-
sional qualifications or the other attributes or merits of individuals in the group, 
would . . . infringe s. 15 equality rights”.27 
                                                                                                                                                              
23
  Lavoie, supra, note 1, at para. 42, per Bastarache J. 
24
  [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513. 
25
  Lavoie, supra, note 1, at para. 42, per Bastarache J. 
26
  For example, see Gibson, The Law of the Charter: Equality Rights (1990), at 72. 
27
  Id., at para. 44. 
(2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) Section 15(1) at the Supreme Court 111 
 
In addition, Bastarache J. attempted to strengthen the line between section 
15(1) and section 1 considerations, stating that “[t]he concepts of dignity and 
freedom are not amorphous and, in my view, do not invite the kind of balancing 
of individual against state interest that is required under section 1 of the Char-
ter.”28 He then admonished: 
... the suggestion that governments should be encouraged if not required to counter 
the claimant’s s. 15(1) argument with public policy arguments is highly misplaced. 
Section 15(1) requires us to define the scope of the individual right to equality, not 
to balance that right against societal values and interests or other Charter rights.29  
In part, Bastarache J. argued that to decide these questions within section 
15(1) would create a hierarchy of grounds of discrimination (perhaps similar to 
the U.S. “levels of scrutiny” approach, which requires that courts grant more or 
less deference to government imposed differential treatment based on the 
grounds of the differential treatment), an interpretation not warranted by the 
text, and which would greatly alter the course of section 15(1) jurisprudence.30 
Madame Justice Arbour’s dissent centred on the third of the Law factors. She 
disapproved of Bastarache J.’s reliance on the subjective view of the claimant 
as to the discriminatory nature of the preference. In her view, Law’s require-
ment that the court take the point of view of a reasonable person would result in 
a finding that the equality right had not been violated — a direct contradiction 
of the majority conclusion.31 
However, calling race “the exception that proves the rule”, Arbour J. did 
agree that: 
[t]here are some distinctions made on certain enumerated or analogous grounds — 
I refer again to those made on the basis of race as an obvious example — which a 
reasonable person could not but view as presumptively, if not unavoidably, dis-
criminatory. The discrimination inquiry may get short-circuited where these kinds 
of distinctions are at issue, not because it is unnecessary or unimportant but be-
cause its outcome will seem all too readily apparent.32 
Justice LeBel’s short reasons focus on the fact that there is a generally ac-
cepted difference between citizenship and non-citizenship, and that the choice 
is with the individual, therefore harms to non-citizens flow from that choice and 
not from government action.33 
                                                                                                                                                              
28
  Id., at para. 47. 
29
  Id., at para. 48. 
30
  Id., at para. 51. 
31
  Id., at paras. 79-81, per Arbour J. 
32
  Id., at para. 83. 
33
  Id., at para. 125. 
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The Chief Justice, and L’Heureux-Dubé J. coauthored dissenting reasons. 
While they agree with the majority’s decision on section 15(1), they would 
place the emphasis somewhat differently. In particular, they consider this case 
very similar to Andrews. Their concern with the majority judgment lies in the 
treatment of the violation at the section 1 stage of analysis. The dissent simply 
is not convinced that the citizenship preference is rationally connected to the 
achievement of either of the two stated objectives, namely enhancing citizen-
ship and encouraging non-citizens to naturalize. In the view of the dissent: 
Far from being rationally connected to the goal of enhancing citizenship, the im-
pugned provision undermines this goal, by presenting Canadian citizenship as 
benefiting from, as nourished by, discrimination against non-citizens . . .34  
The dissent also placed emphasis on the total lack of evidence presented by 
the government to show that exclusion of non-citizens “enhanced citizenship,” 
arguing that the majority was overly deferential in not requiring evidence at this 
stage. Likewise the Chief Justice and L’Heureux Dubé J. would not have ac-
cepted the second objective even if there had been evidence to support it, since 
they saw it as fundamentally at odds with the values of tolerance, equality and 
respect which supposedly ground Canadian citizenship.  
In contrast, the majority’s approach to section 1 was prefaced with the fol-
lowing:  
In this case, we are presented with a law that attempts to promote the value of Ca-
nadian citizenship by detracting from the rights of non-citizens; as this inevitably 
requires Parliament to balance the interests of competing groups, some degree of 
deference is required in the application of Oakes. . . . That being said, the law does 
not promote the interests of a vulnerable group, is not premised on particularly 
complex social science evidence, and interferes with an activity (namely employ-
ment) whose social value is relatively high. . .35 
Applying this deferential approach, Bastarache J. agreed that the objectives 
of the law were enhancing citizenship and facilitating naturalization,36 and 
agreed that these objectives were pressing and substantial. In fact, throughout 
the majority’s section 1 analysis, Parliament is repeatedly afforded deferential 
treatment:  
While there is a point at which granting privileges to citizens may be unjustifiable 
under s. 1 — banning immigrants from social housing, perhaps — that point is not 
the same as the point at which this Court finds a s. 15(1) violation. Rather, as con-
templated by s. 1 of the Charter, Parliament is entitled to some deference as to 
                                                                                                                                                              
34
  Id., at para. 10. 
35
  Id., at para. 53, per Bastarache J. 
36
  Id., at para. 57, per Bastarache J. 
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whether one privilege or another advances a compelling state interest. In this case, 
Parliament’s view is supported by common sense and widespread international 
practice, both of which are relevant indicators of a rational connection.37 
Since Wilson J.’s approach to section 1 in Andrews carried the majority, def-
erence at section 1 has not been the pattern in section 15 cases.38 The dissenting 
judges, the Chief Justice and L’Heureux-Dubé J. are clearly unhappy with the 
approach taken by the majority. Madame Justice Arbour (who did not find a 
violation of section 15(1); see II.3. above), stated her disapproval of the major-
ity reasons for the record: 
. . . I cannot accept that the violation of so sacrosanct a right as the guarantee of 
equality is justified where the government is pursuing an objective as abstract and 
general as the promotion of naturalization. [This would]…. leave scarcely any le-
gitimate state objective seriously constrained by the constitutional fetter of equality. 
…..We must be careful, in our understandable eagerness to extend equality rights 
as widely as possible, to avoid stripping those rights of any meaningful content. 
Lack of care can only result in the creation of an equality guarantee that is far-
reaching but wafer-thin, an expansive but insubstantial shield with which to fend 
off state incursions on our dignity and freedom. … The Oakes test was not de-
signed to bear the considerable strain of salvaging under s. 1 a plethora of laws that 
would otherwise offend a s. 15(1) analysis essentially lacking consideration for the 
existence of objectively discernible discrimination. … It would in my opinion be 
preferable, from the perspectives of analytical integrity, justificatory force and fi-
delity to this Court’s prior equality jurisprudence, to avoid this paradox alto-
gether.39 
In other words, Arbour J.’s decision not to find a violation at section 15(1) 
ought to be considered in context of her assertion that once section 15(1) viola-
tions are found, they should be difficult to justify under section 1. She is not 
prepared to be deferential at section 1. Instead, she proposes a more restrictive 
(for the claimant) section 15(1) combined with a more restrictive (for the gov-
ernment) section 1.  
The question of the proper interpretation of section 15(1) was first addressed 
by the Supreme Court in Andrews. Prior to the decision, some argued that 
section 15 was violated by any government differentiation on enumerated 
grounds. All other factors and arguments would be left for the section 1 analy-
sis. The more robust interpretation of “discrimination” and “inequality” fa-
                                                                                                                                                              
37
  Id., at para. 59, per Bastarache J. 
38
  See Martin, “Balancing Individual Rights to Equality and Social Goals” (2001) 80 Can. 
Bar Rev. 298 at 355 (“…deference is rarely relied upon in equality cases. Sometimes deference is 
not even discussed and when raised, it is not normally pivotal to the decision. In most equality 
cases the Court emphasizes its role as the protector of Charter rights.” Citations omitted).  
39
  Id., at paras. 85-87. 
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voured by the Court has generally created uphill battles for both claimants at 
section 15, and governments at section 1. However, it has also led to the in-
creasing use of arguments seemingly more appropriate at section 1 at the sec-
tion 15 stage. This problem reached a head in the Equality Trilogy of 1995, 
when the Court split badly over the use of the so-called “relevancy” test, which 
considered the functional values underlying legislation crucial in the determina-
tion of whether or not a difference in treatment is discriminatory.40 
In Law, the Court appeared to resolve the disagreements of the Equality 
Trilogy, but Lavoie has revealed that there are still deep divisions in the court. 
These divisions encompass both the proper application of the section 15 analy-
sis as set out in Law, the correct approach to section 1, and the appropriate 
relationship between the two. Certainly Lavoie does strengthen the critique that 
the Law test (notably the third part and the four factors it urges for considera-
tion) is too open textured to function as a test which will guide government 
behaviour and lower court decisions.41 
The majority and dissenting reasons in Lavoie do not stake out different po-
sitions on the approach to section 15(1), which remains anchored in a substan-
tive and purposive approach to Charter equality. We see no suggestion of a 
move to a formal equality test at section 15(1). This test, often unfavourably 
compared to the “substantive” notion of equality that Canadian jurisprudence 
has followed since Andrews, appeared to be the basis of Marceau J.A.’s dissent 
at the Federal Court of Appeal.42 Justice Bastarache explicitly rejects this ap-
proach. Justice Arbour’s analysis does move further away from the approach 
Canadian courts have traditionally followed, but she argues that she chose her 
approach mindful of the interplay between section 15(1) and section 1. In addi-
tion, Justice Arbour’s dissent on the section 15(1) question seems to be based 
more on her reading of the facts and her view of the result of the “reasonable 
person” subjective-objective approach to the question of discrimination at the 
third stage of the Law test. Likewise LeBel J.’s approach at section 15(1) is 
premised on the temporary nature of non-citizenship.43  
                                                                                                                                                              
40
  Thibaudeau v. R., [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627; Egan v. Canada, supra, note 24; Miron v. Trudel, 
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 418. 
41
  See for instance, Ross, “A Flawed Synthesis of the Law” (2000) 11:3 Constitutional Fo-
rum 74; Bredt & Nishisato, “The Supreme Court’s new equality test: A critique” (2000) 8 
CanadaWatch 17 (arguing that Law relies too heavily on context, and is overly complex, and also 
that the new test eviscerates s. 1 of the Charter). 
42
  On the subject of substantive notions of equality, see for instance Hughes, “Recognizing 
Substantive Equality as a Foundational Constitutional Principle” (1999) 22 Dal. L.J. 1. 
43
  Although in Andrews, as McLachlin C.J.C. and L’Heureux-Dubé J. point out, the Court 
rejected an approach which would have essentially forced non-citizens to become citizens in order 
to gain “equality”. The forced choice itself is at the heart of the discrimination question. 
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The serious dispute, therefore, appears to be in relation to the proper content 
and application of the tests at section 15 and section 1. Ought the Court to blur 
the line between the two parts to render section 15(1) claims harder to make 
out, as Arbour J. argues, in order to prevent being forced into a weakened and 
overly deferential section 1 analysis?44 Or is the answer that sought by the 
dissenting judges, who would have maintained strict standards at section 1, in 
keeping with past jurisprudence on section 15? The majority decision to find 
discrimination on the basis of citizenship and then find the discrimination 
justified under such a deferential application of the Oakes test does seem to 
bode ill for future equality claimants. All of this is a bit of a surprise, given that 
Law itself was criticized for blurring the line between section 15 and section 1, 
whereas in Lavoie we see seven members of the Court arguing that a strict 
division is necessary.45 Yet with the Court so divided as it was in Lavoie, we 
will likely have to wait for the next case to confirm any of these thoughts, or 
build new theories about the nature and limits of equality rights under section 
15(1).46 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The section 15(1) cases from late 2001 and early 2002 do not have a unify-
ing theme. In truth, only one of the cases considered in this paper is truly a 
section 15(1) case. The only strong stand the court appears to have taken is 
found in the refusal or inability to clear up nagging questions about the proper 
relationship between various legal rules and issues — equality and other rights, 
section 15 and section 1, deference to elected officials and protection of minori-
ties. Still, the decision in TWU does confirm the importance of equality as a 
Charter value even as it raises the spectre of serious and unavoidable clashes 
between religious freedoms and equality rights which current jurisprudence 
may be ill-equipped to deal with. The only true section 15(1) case, Lavoie, 
contains some surprises, especially considering the conclusions reached by last 
year’s conference contributors.47 Seemingly sensitized to the position of the 
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  Lavoie, supra, note 1, at para. 86, per Arbour J. 
45
  See Bredt & Nishisato, supra, note 41; see also Corbett et al., infra, note 47. 
46
  See Appendix A for a partial list of s. 15 cases remanded for judgment and granted leave 
to appeal to the Supreme Court. 
47
  Corbett, Spector, & Strug, “Section 15 Jurisprudence in the Supreme Court of Canada in 
2000” (2001) 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 30 at 52 (based on Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment 
& Immigration), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703, and Lovelace v. Ontario (sub nom. Ardoch Algonquin First 
Nation & Allies v. Ontario), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950, the authors were critical of the Court’s seeming 
dismissal of the position of the rights claimant, and of the Court’s willingness to accept arguments 
more properly treated under s. 1 inside the s. 15 analysis). 
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equality rights claimant, the majority approach in Lavoie is focused almost 
exclusively on the claimants’ point of view in finding a violation of human 
dignity at section 15(1). Then, having drawn a bright line preventing the incur-
sion of “policy” arguments during the section 15(1) stage, the majority goes on 
to apply an extremely deferential approach at section 1. Whether Lavoie is an 
aberration or the beginning of a trend towards increasing deference at section 1 
in equality cases remains to be seen. Those interested will be watching for oral 
arguments and the release of decisions currently on reserve in order to gain 
some clear sense of what, exactly, our right to equality is guaranteeing us these 
days.  
APPENDIX A: THE SCC & SECTION 15(1): HEARINGS AND 
JUDGMENTS EXPECTED IN 2002 
On reserve 
Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1999] J.Q. No. 1365, [1999] R.J.Q. 
1033. Heard October 29, 2001. 
 
Sauve v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer) [1999] F.C.J. No. 1577, [2000] 2 
F.C. 117. Heard December 10, 2001. 
Inscribed for hearing  
Chamberlain v. School District No. 36 (Surrey) (2000), 191 D.L.R. (4th) 128 
(B.C. C.A.), [2000] B.C.J. No. 1875; leave to appeal granted October 4, 2001 
SCC Bulletin 2001 1772, [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 324 QL. Inscribed for hearing, 
June 12, 2002. 
Leave granted 
Martin v. Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) (2000), 192 D.L.R. 
(4th) 611, [2000] N.S.J. No 353 (N.S. C.A.); leave to appeal granted June 14, 
2001 without reasons SCC Bulletin 2001 p. 1097. Appeal not yet inscribed for 
hearing [2001] SCCA No. 23. 
 
Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney General) (2001), 200 D.L.R. (4th) 685 
(B.C. C.A.), [2001] B.C.J. No. 1052; leave to appeal granted November 8, 2001 
without reasons SCC Bulletin 2001 1994.  
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